2025–26 trade actions sharply raise average U.S. tariffs, end de minimis, and reset multiple bilateral tariff frameworks, requiring major import compliance changes.

REGULATORY BRIEFING – 2025–2026 TRADE AND TARIFF MEASURES AFFECTING U.S. IMPORTS

1. What Changed

1.1 Global Tariff Regime and Bilateral Frameworks

• The Administration implemented a new “America First Trade Policy” featuring:
• A global tariff regime with significantly higher baseline tariffs on many trading partners.
• Multiple new or revised trade frameworks that alter tariff treatment for imports from key partners.
• Key bilateral/sectoral arrangements with direct U.S. import‑tariff implications:
• EU Framework (Aug 2025):
• U.S. establishes a 15% baseline tariff on EU‑origin goods, with exclusions for some components/resources not readily available in the U.S.
• EU eliminates tariffs on all U.S. industrial goods (export‑side) and expands purchases of U.S. energy, defense equipment, and AI chips.
• Japan Strategic Trade and Investment Agreement (Jul 2025):
• U.S. applies a 15% baseline tariff on most goods from Japan, with some adjustments.
• Japan improves market access for U.S. agricultural and industrial exports.
• U.K. Economic Prosperity Deal (May 2025):
• U.S. provides “adjusted tariff treatment” for select U.K. products (details not numerically specified in the text, but implies preferential or modified rates vs MFN).
• India Framework (Feb 2026):
• U.S. agrees to reduce tariff rates on Indian goods to 18% (described as a framework rate), while India cuts/eliminates tariffs on U.S. industrial and agricultural goods.
• Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (Feb 2026):
• Focused mainly on export access and investment; text does not specify a new U.S. baseline rate but implies structured reciprocal tariff treatment.
• South Korea (Nov 2025):
• Reaffirmation/modernization of existing agreements; no explicit new baseline rate stated, but framed within the broader global tariff regime.

1.2 Additional Bilateral Trade Deals Affecting U.S. Imports

• A series of agreements with other partners change tariff treatment on U.S. imports and exports:
• Indonesia: Reciprocal trade deal; opens Indonesian market to U.S. exports and strengthens supply chain cooperation (no explicit U.S. tariff baseline stated, but imports from Indonesia will be subject to the new global regime unless otherwise exempted).
• Malaysia: Preferential treatment for U.S. exports and critical minerals partnership; U.S. import tariff specifics not detailed.
• Cambodia: U.S. deal that “completely eliminates tariffs on U.S. goods” into Cambodia (export‑side); no change to U.S. tariffs on Cambodian imports specified.
• Thailand: Framework eliminating tariffs on 99% of goods in the bilateral relationship, including industrial, food, and agricultural products. This implies near‑zero U.S. tariffs on almost all Thai‑origin goods and reciprocal treatment for U.S. exports.
• Vietnam: Framework that “removes tariffs on almost all U.S. goods” into Vietnam; U.S. import‑side tariff specifics not detailed, but Vietnam is also listed among countries with large import increases, suggesting supply‑chain shifts.
• El Salvador, Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, Switzerland/Liechtenstein, Bangladesh, North Macedonia: Frameworks or agreements that reduce or remove tariffs and non‑tariff barriers, primarily improving U.S. export access; U.S. import‑side tariff details are not numerically specified but will be governed by the new global tariff architecture.

1.3 Expanded Use of Section 232 National Security Tariffs

• The Administration is actively using Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to address import‑related national security risks.
• Targeted sectors include:
• Steel (NAICS 3311/3312 partial grouping)
• Aluminum (NAICS 3313)
• Copper, nickel, lead, zinc (NAICS 21223)
• Lumber
• Automobiles and trucks
• These actions are explicitly described as sectoral tariffs to rebuild domestic capacity and address import dependence and global excess capacity.
• While specific ad valorem rates are not provided in the text, importers in these sectors should assume:
• Continuation or expansion of existing Section 232 additional duties (e.g., historical 25% on certain steel, 10% on certain aluminum) and/or new measures on copper, lumber, autos/trucks.

1.4 Elimination of De Minimis Treatment for Imports

• In 2025, the Administration fully closed the de minimis loophole for shipments.
• Previous regime:
• De minimis threshold was $800 (since March 2016) under 19 U.S.C. 1321.
• Shipments valued at or below $800 could enter duty‑free with minimal inspection.
• De minimis shipments grew from 134 million (2015) to 1.36 billion (2024).
• New regime:
• De minimis treatment is ended for commercial shipments.
• All shipments, regardless of value, are now subject to normal duty assessment, admissibility review, and enforcement.
• CBP reports collecting more than $1 billion in duties that previously went uncollected under de minimis.
• Rationale cited:
• Level the playing field between foreign direct‑to‑consumer models and U.S. brick‑and‑mortar retailers.
• Address public health and safety risks: in 2024, de minimis shipments accounted for ~98% of narcotics seizures, 97% of counterfeit goods seizures, and 77% of health and safety seizures (including weapons parts and fentanyl precursors).

1.5 Trade Enforcement and Anti‑Evasion Measures

• CBP has increased enforcement under the Enforce and Protect Act (EAPA) and related authorities, focusing on:
• Misrepresentation of country of origin.
• Transshipment through intermediary countries to evade duties (including Section 232/301 and ADD/CVD).
• DOJ and DHS launched a cross‑agency Trade Fraud Task Force on Aug 29, 2025, to combat duty and tariff evasion.
• Several high‑profile cases have been resolved involving significant illegal duty evasion via origin misdeclaration and transshipment.

1.6 Macroeconomic Trade Shifts

• Goods trade deficit narrowed under the Trump Administration:
• Monthly average goods deficit: $101 billion (2024) → $87 billion (Nov 2025).
• Major import pattern changes (Jan–Oct 2025 vs Jan–Oct 2024):
• China: –$97.1 billion (–26.7%) in U.S. goods imports; share of total U.S. imports fell to 9.3% (near 2000 level of 8.9%), down from 13.4% in 2024.
• Canada: –$20.0 billion (–5.8%).
• Germany: –$6.4 billion (–4.8%).
• South Korea: –$5.7 billion (–5.2%).
• Singapore: –$4.7 billion (–12.9%).
• Increases: Taiwan +$59.6 billion (+61.5%), Switzerland +$54.4 billion (+125.3%), Vietnam +$45.5 billion (+40.4%), Ireland +$39.8 billion (+46.8%), Mexico +$23.9 billion (+5.6%).
• These shifts indicate active supply‑chain re‑routing in response to tariffs and enforcement.

2. Affected Products and Sectors

2.1 Broad Country‑of‑Origin Impacts

• EU‑origin goods: Generally subject to a 15% baseline U.S. tariff, with some exclusions for non‑available inputs.
• Japan‑origin goods: Generally subject to a 15% baseline U.S. tariff on most goods.
• India‑origin goods: U.S. tariffs reduced to 18% under the new framework (likely as a harmonized or average rate across many lines; specific HTS changes will be in implementing documents).
• Thailand‑origin goods: Tariffs eliminated on 99% of goods (industrial, food, agricultural) under the framework.
• Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Switzerland/Liechtenstein, North Macedonia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina, Ecuador: Tariff treatment adjusted via frameworks; details by HTS line will be in USTR/CBP implementation notices.

2.2 Section 232‑Sensitive Sectors

• Steel and steel products (HTS Chapters 72–73; especially 7206–7217, 7301–7326).
• Aluminum and aluminum products (HTS 7601–7616).
• Copper, nickel, lead, zinc and related products (HTS 7401–7409, 7501–7508, 7801–7806, 7901–7907).
• Lumber and wood products (HTS Chapter 44).
• Automobiles and trucks (HTS 8703, 8704, 8708 and related parts).

2.3 De Minimis‑Affected Flows

• All low‑value e‑commerce and direct‑to‑consumer imports previously entered under Section 321 de minimis (19 U.S.C. 1321), across all HTS chapters, including but not limited to:
• Apparel and footwear (Chapters 61–64).
• Consumer electronics (Chapters 84–85, 90).
• Toys and games (Chapter 95).
• Household goods, small appliances, cosmetics, etc.

3. Rate Changes and Quantitative Impacts

3.1 Baseline Tariff Levels (as described in the Report)

• EU: 15% baseline tariff on EU‑origin goods (with some exclusions).
• Japan: 15% baseline tariff on most goods from Japan.
• India: U.S. tariff rates on Indian goods reduced to 18%.
• Thailand: Tariffs eliminated on 99% of goods (effectively 0% on nearly all Thai‑origin imports).
• Other partners: Specific numerical rates not provided in the text; importers must consult implementing Federal Register notices and HTS updates.

3.2 De Minimis

• Previous threshold: $800 per shipment (commercial de minimis) – duty‑free, minimal inspection.
• New regime: No de minimis duty exemption for commercial shipments; all imports now potentially dutiable at MFN/FTA/Section 232/301/ADD/CVD rates.
• Fiscal impact: CBP has collected more than $1 billion in additional duties since closure of de minimis.

3.3 Trade Remedy and Enforcement Context

• While specific new ADD/CVD rates are not detailed in the text, the increased EAPA and DOJ/DHS enforcement focus on:
• Ensuring collection of existing ADD/CVD and special tariffs (e.g., Section 232/301).
• Penalizing misclassification and origin fraud.

4. Key Dates

• March 2016: De minimis threshold increased to $800 (historical reference).
• 2024: De minimis shipments reach 1.36 billion; 98% of narcotics seizures, 97% of counterfeit seizures, 77% of health/safety seizures are in de minimis channel.
• 2025:
• De minimis loophole closed (effective date not given in the excerpt; importers should confirm via CBP notices, but the policy is in force by 2025 data).
• August 2025: U.S.–EU Framework on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade announced.
• July 2025: U.S.–Japan Strategic Trade and Investment Agreement announced.
• May 2025: U.S.–U.K. Economic Prosperity Deal agreed.
• November 2025: U.S.–South Korea strengthened economic partnership announced.
• August 29, 2025: DOJ–DHS Trade Fraud Task Force launched.
• February 2026:
• U.S.–India reciprocal trade framework announced.
• U.S.–Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade announced (building on Jan 2026 investment agreement).

5. Required Actions for Importers, Brokers, and Compliance Teams

5.1 Reassess Country‑of‑Origin Tariff Exposure

• Map all SKUs by country of origin and HTS classification to identify exposure to:
• New 15% baseline tariffs on EU and Japan.
• 18% framework rate on India.
• 0% (or near‑zero) tariffs on 99% of Thai‑origin goods.
• Any other partner‑specific changes once implementing schedules are published.
• Update landed cost models and pricing for affected products.

5.2 Review and Update HTS Classifications and FTA/Framework Eligibility

• Ensure accurate HTS classification to:
• Apply correct MFN and special rates (including Section 232/301 and any Chapter 99 provisions).
• Determine eligibility for preferential treatment under new frameworks (e.g., Thailand 99% duty‑free coverage).
• Monitor for:
• New or amended HTS notes and Chapter 99 provisions implementing these frameworks.
• Any product‑specific exclusions from the 15% baseline for EU/Japan.

5.3 Adjust to the End of De Minimis

• Operational changes:
• All shipments, regardless of value, now require full entry (or appropriate simplified entry) with HTS classification, valuation, and origin declaration.
• Ensure systems and brokers can handle increased entry volumes and data requirements.
• Financial planning:
• Budget for duties on previously duty‑free low‑value shipments; incorporate into pricing and margin analysis.
• Compliance:
• Implement robust screening for admissibility (e.g., forced labor, IP/counterfeit, safety) now that low‑value shipments are fully in scope.

5.4 Manage Section 232 and Other Trade Remedy Risks

• For steel, aluminum, copper, lumber, autos/trucks and related parts:
• Confirm whether products fall under existing or expanded Section 232 measures.
• Apply any applicable Chapter 99 numbers for additional duties.
• Evaluate potential for product‑specific exclusions or alternative sourcing.
• For all high‑duty sectors (including ADD/CVD):
• Strengthen origin verification and supply‑chain traceability to avoid inadvertent transshipment exposure.

5.5 Enhance Anti‑Evasion Controls

• In light of EAPA and the Trade Fraud Task Force:
• Conduct due diligence on suppliers and intermediaries, especially in countries with large import increases (e.g., Taiwan, Switzerland, Vietnam, Ireland, Mexico) that may be used as transshipment hubs.
• Implement internal controls to prevent:
• Misdeclaration of country of origin.
• Misclassification to lower‑duty HTS codes.
• Undervaluation.
• Prepare for potential CBP inquiries, audits, and EAPA investigations.

5.6 Monitor Implementation Documents and HTS Updates

• Regularly review:
• Federal Register notices from USTR, CBP, and Commerce implementing each agreement and Section 232 action.
• HTSUS updates (including Chapter 99) for new tariff lines, rates, and notes.
• Update internal tariff databases and broker instructions accordingly.

6. References and Source Documents

Primary White House/CEA PDFs (as cited in the prompt):

• Chapter 3 – Rebuilding America’s International Trade Policy (2026 ERP):

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/ERP-2026-3.-Rebuilding-Americas-International-Trade-Policy.pdf

Key agreements and policy references (implementation details will be in Federal Register/USTR/CBP notices):

• U.S.–EU Framework on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade (Aug 2025):

Referenced as DOC, IEA, and USTR 2025a; European Commission 2025; White House 2025a.

• U.S.–Japan Strategic Trade and Investment Agreement (Jul 2025):

White House 2025b.

• U.S.–U.K. Economic Prosperity Deal (May 2025):

DOC, IEA, and USTR 2025b; White House 2025c.

• U.S.–Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment Agreement (Jan/Feb 2026):

USTR 2026a; DOC 2026.

• U.S.–South Korea economic partnership (Nov 2025):

USTR 2025b; White House 2025d.

• U.S.–India reciprocal trade framework (Feb 2026):

White House 2026a.

• De minimis policy and CBP data:

CBP 2025; Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal 2025 (as cited in the ERP chapter).

• Trade Fraud Task Force:

DOJ 2025c; related enforcement actions DOJ 2025a, 2025b, 2025d.

Importers should supplement this briefing with the latest HTSUS, CBP Cargo Systems Messaging Service (CSMS) notices, and Federal Register publications implementing each specific tariff change and agreement.